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Abstract 
 
Previous evidence for the effectiveness of Immediate Incubation in divergent creative tasks 
has been weak with earlier studies exhibiting a range of methodological problems. The issue 
is theoretically important as a demonstration of Immediate Incubation effects would 
strengthen the case for the involvement of unconscious work in incubation effects. 
 
The present experiment used a creative divergent thinking task (Alternative Uses) and 
separate experimental groups had incubation periods which were either Delayed or 
Immediate and consisted of either spatial or verbal tasks. Control groups were tested without 
incubation periods. Checks were carried out for intermittent conscious work on the target task 
during the incubation periods. 
 
Significant incubation effects were found and were stronger for Immediate Incubation than 
for Delayed Incubation. Performance was not different between verbal and spatial incubation 
conditions. No evidence for intermittent conscious working was found. The results supported 
a role for unconscious work in creative divergent thinking, particularly in the case of 
Immediate Incubation.  
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Creative problems are generally defined as problems which require the production of new 
approaches and solutions, where by “new”, we mean novel to the solver (Boden, 2004). 
Explaining how such personally novel solutions are reached is still a major challenge for the 
psychology of thinking. In analyses of creative problem solving it has often been claimed that 
setting creative problems aside for a while can lead to novel solution ideas occurring, either 
spontaneously while attending to other matters, or very rapidly when the previously 
intractable problem is revisited. Personal accounts by eminent creative thinkers in a range of 
domains have attested to this phenomenon (e.g., Poincaré, 1913; Ghiselin, 1952; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). In his well known four stage analysis of creative problem solving, 
Wallas (1926, p.80) labelled a stage in which the problem is set aside and not consciously 
addressed as “Incubation” and this stage is the focus of the present study. 
 
Following Wallas (1926), a substantial body of experimental research on incubation effects 
has accumulated using both (a) insight problems, in which there is a single solution, but the 
solver has to develop a new way of representing or structuring the task to reach solution and 
(b) divergent problems, in which there is no single correct solution but as many novel and 
useful ideas as possible are sought.  The prototypical divergent task, which was the task used 
in the present study,  is the Alternative Uses task, in which participants are asked to generate 
as many uses different from the normal use to one or more familiar objects, such as a brick 
(Guilford, 1971; Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield & Wilson, 1978; Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony & Wynn, 2007). In the classic laboratory paradigm for studying incubation effects, 
which we will label the Delayed Incubation paradigm, participants in the incubation 
condition work on the target problem for an experimenter determined time (preparation time) 
and are then given an interpolated activity away from the target task for a fixed time 
(incubation period) and finally return to the target problem for a post-incubation work period. 
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Performance of the incubation group is contrasted with that of a control group who work 
continuously on the target task for a time equal to the sum of the preparation and post-
incubation conscious working time of the incubation group. A recently developed variant 
(Immediate Incubation paradigm) employs an interpolated task for a fixed period 
immediately after instructions on the target problem and before any conscious work has been 
undertaken on the target problem, followed by uninterrupted work on the target problem 
(Djiksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). 
 
Previous studies of Delayed and Immediate Incubation effects 
There is now considerable evidence from laboratory studies for the efficacy of Delayed 
Incubation, i.e., that setting a problem aside after a period of work is beneficial (see Dodds, 
Ward & Smith, 2003, for a qualitative review). A recent meta-analysis by Sio and Ormerod 
(2009), of 117 studies identified a positive effect of Delayed Incubation, where the overall 
average effect size was in the low-medium band (mean d = .32) over a range of insight and 
divergent tasks. For divergent tasks considered separately, the mean d was larger at .65, 
which may be considered to be in the high-medium band of effect sizes. Overall, the basic 
existence of Delayed Incubation effects can now be regarded as well established, particularly 
in the case of divergent problem solving. 
 
Regarding the efficacy of Immediate Incubation, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) reported  
studies in which better decisions and more creative solutions were found when Immediate 
Incubation breaks were given after the decision problems or divergent tasks were presented. 
In the realm of decision problems, Nordgren, Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011) found that Delayed 
Incubation produced better decisions than Immediate Incubation and both were better than 
No Incubation. 
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However, the beneficial effects of Immediate Incubation on decision making have proven 
difficult to reproduce and a number of unsuccessful replication attempts have now been 
reported (e.g., Acker, 2008; Newell, Wong, Cheung & Rakow, 2009; Rey, Goldstein & 
Perruchet, 2009; Payne, Samper, Bettman & Luce, 2008).  
 
The present paper concerns creative thinking using a divergent task and Dijksterhuis and 
Meurs (2006) did report that, in their Experiment 3, participants produced responses of higher 
rated average creativity when the instructions to list things one can do with a brick were 
followed immediately by a three minute distractor task (Immediate Incubation) before 
generating uses, compared to participants who began generating uses right away. It may be 
noted that the instructions did not ask for unusual uses which is the norm in divergent 
thinking tasks and so it is not clear whether participants had a goal of being creative. They 
may have been reporting infrequent uses that they happened to know rather than generating 
uses novel to them. Raters tend to score infrequent responses as creative although such uses 
may have been pre-known and therefore could reflect memory retrieval rather than generation 
of subjectively novel responses (Quellmalz, 1985). Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony and Wynn 
(2007) developed a self report method for assessing subjective novelty which addresses the 
issue of individually creative responses as against rare responses and this method was used in 
the present experiment. In this method participants indicate which of their responses were 
first thought of while doing the task and so were subjectively novel. Gilhooly et al (2007) 
found converging evidence for the validity of this method of assessing responses as 
personally old or new. Self judged new responses were rated as significantly more creative by 
independent judges and were more frequently produced by participants with higher executive 
functioning test scores. Self judged novel responses occurred later in the sequences of 
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responses which is consistent with a reliance on memory for retrieval of early responses 
followed by executively demanding processes for generation of novel ideas when the pool of 
already known uses is exhausted.  
 
Zhong, Dijksterhuis and Galinsky (2008), using the Immediate Incubation paradigm with the 
Remote Associates Task (RAT) in which participants have to retrieve an associate common 
to three given words (e.g., cottage, blue, mouse? Answer : cheese), found that, although   
Immediate Incubation did not facilitate actual solution, it appeared to activate solution words 
on unsolved trials, as indicated by lexical decision measures, compared to unsolved trials 
without Immediate Incubation. However, it may be noted that some theorists (e.g., Weisberg, 
2006, p.468) dispute whether the RAT is a creative task as the solutions are already known 
associations rather than novel responses. A normal criterion for a creative task is that it 
requires the participant to generate a response which is novel for the participant rather than 
one already known.  
 
 Overall, the evidence in favour of a beneficial effect of Immediate Incubation in creative 
tasks is rather weak, being based on one study of a divergent task which did not require novel 
responses (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006) and a study (Zhong et al., 2008) using a convergent 
task  (the RAT) to which the responses are not themselves creative. The question of whether 
Immediate Incubation is effective in creative tasks is important for its bearing on theories of 
incubation and the present study aimed to provide more solid evidence regarding the efficacy 
or otherwise of Immediate Incubation than has been available hitherto.  We will now outline 
the main theories regarding incubation effects. 
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Theories of Incubation effects 
1. Intermittent Conscious work: This theory suggests that although incubation is intended 
to be a period without conscious work on the target task nevertheless participants may 
carry out intermittent conscious work (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano & Yaniv, 
1995, p.82; Weisberg, 2006, pp. 443-445). Any conscious work during the supposed 
incubation period would reduce the time required when the target problem was re-
addressed – but would be expected impair performance on the interpolated task. As a 
check against the possibility of intermittent conscious work, performance on the 
interpolated task during the incubation period should be compared with performance of a 
control group working on the same interpolated task without being in an incubation 
condition. A deficit in the interpolated task on the part of the incubation group would be 
consistent with the hypothesis of some conscious work on the target task during 
incubation. Although this seems a rather basic methodological check, surprisingly it does 
not appear to have been carried out in previous research (Dodds et al., 2003; Sio & 
Ormerod, 2009).  The study reported here incorporated suitable checks for intermittent 
conscious work on the target task during the incubation period. 
 
2.  “Fresh look”: This view (e.g., Simon, 1966; Segal, 2004; see also, Dijksterhuis & 
Meurs, 2006) proposes an important role for automatic passive reduction in idea strength or 
activation during the incubation period. The proposal is that misleading strategies, mistaken 
assumptions and related “mental sets” weaken through forgetting during the incubation 
period and thus a fresh start or “set shifting” is facilitated when the problem is resumed. On 
this view, incubation works by allowing weakening of misleading approaches to the task 
during a break after a period of work (Delayed Incubation) thus allowing a fresh start. This 
approach would not expect a beneficial effect of Immediate Incubation because with 
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Immediate Incubation, there is no time for sets or fixations to develop, and so forgetting of 
misleading approaches cannot occur.  
 
  
3. Unconscious work: This approach proposes that incubation effects occur through 
active but unconscious processing of the problem materials (as against the passive 
forgetting processes envisaged in the Fresh Look approach.) The term “unconscious 
work” seems to have first been used in the context of problem solving by Poincaré 
(1913, p.393). Other phrases referring to the same notion include “nonconscious idea 
generation” (Snyder et al., 2004) and “unconscious thought” (Dijsterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006) but we will generally use the term “unconscious work” in this paper. The 
question naturally arises of what form unconscious work might take? Is it possible 
that unconscious work could be just like conscious work but carried out without 
conscious awareness? Or is it better thought of as automatic spreading activation 
along associative links as against a rule or strategy governed activity? We will 
consider the question of what form unconscious work might take more fully in the 
Discussion section.  
 
The possible mechanisms outlined above are not mutually exclusive. A Delayed Incubation 
condition could conceivably evoke all three, with the person engaging in some intermittent 
conscious work when attention wanders from the interpolated incubation task and with 
some beneficial forgetting and unconscious work taking place when the person is attending 
to the interpolated incubation task. However, an Immediate Incubation effect would not be 
consistent with a Fresh Look explanation but could involve some intermittent conscious 
work and/or some unconscious work. The present study aimed to clarify the contributions of 
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the three types of processes in explaining Immediate and Delayed Incubation without 
assuming that one and only one process can explain all the findings.  
 
Theories of incubation: previous studies 
What does previous research suggest regarding the possible mechanisms of incubation? 
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) argued, as outlined above, that in the Immediate Incubation 
paradigm, the “fresh look” approach may be ruled out as there is no period of initial work in 
which misleading fixations and sets could be developed. Thus, if Immediate Incubation is 
shown to be effective, the unconscious work hypothesis must remain in contention for 
Immediate Incubation effects and would also be a candidate explanation for Delayed 
Incubation.  Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) took the beneficial effects of the Immediate 
Incubation paradigm on a divergent task in their Experiment 3 as support for the role of 
unconscious work in incubation. However, as already mentioned, the task in this study did 
not clearly meet the usual criteria for a creative task and the scoring did not distinguish 
infrequent from genuinely novel responses. Hence, this study does not unequivocally 
address creative thinking as against free recall of possibly rare but previously experienced 
events from episodic and semantic memory. 
 
Snyder, Mitchell, Ellwood and Yates (2004) also found evidence consistent with unconscious 
work from a study using the Delayed Incubation paradigm but with a surprise return to the 
target task. Even although the return to the main task was unexpected, beneficial effects were 
found, suggesting automatic continuation of unconscious work could have occurred when the 
task was set aside. It should be noted, however, that Snyder et al., used a task that simply 
required production of uses for a piece of paper as against generation of novel uses and so their 
task did not necessarily involve creative thinking as against recall.  
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It is of interest that both Segal (2004) and Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) used interpolated tasks 
during their incubation periods that were different in character from the target tasks. Segal’s 
target task was spatial while the interpolated tasks were verbal; Dijksterhuis and Meurs’s target 
task was verbal but the interpolated task was spatial. From Dodds et al.’s (2003) extensive 
review, the issue of similarity between target and interpolated tasks does not appear to have been 
addressed hitherto. The similarity relationship between target and interpolated tasks could be 
important in that the main competing hypotheses suggest different effects of similarity. If 
unconscious work is the main process then interpolated tasks similar to the target task should 
interfere with any unconscious work using the same mental resources and so lead to weaker (or 
even reversed) incubation effects when compared with effects of dissimilar interpolated tasks. On 
the other hand, the selective forgetting mechanism would suggest that interpolated tasks similar to 
the target task would cause greater interference which would lead to more forgetting and 
enhanced incubation benefits. 
  
Helie, Sun and Xiong (2008) found that more executively demanding interpolated tasks reduced 
reminiscence scores for free recall of pictures when a surprise free recall was required after the 
interpolated task. In this study, participants studied booklets of pictures for a set period, freely 
recalled the items, then did various different interpolated activities before being re-tested with free 
recall of the pictures. The reminiscence score was the number of new items recalled on the second 
test. The results were consistent with Helie & Sun’s (2010) Explicit-Implicit Interaction  model 
that can be applied to creative problem solving and which allows for unconscious implicit 
processes in parallel with conscious explicit processes. However, the target task in Helie et al. 
(2008) was free recall rather than creative thinking and so it does not speak directly to divergent 
thinking which is the focus of the present paper.      
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Ellwood, Pallier, Snyder and Gallate (2009) found a beneficial effect on number of responses 
post-incubation of a dissimilar interpolated task in a Delayed Incubation experiment. However, 
this study used a fluency of uses task rather than a novel uses task. Also, as Ellwood et al. pointed 
out, although their findings are consistent with an explanation in terms of unconscious work, an 
explanation in terms of selective relief of fatigue could also be invoked to account for the effects 
of similarity between incubation and target tasks. On this view, for example, a spatial Delayed 
Incubation task very different from a main verbal task could allow more recovery from specific 
fatigue of verbal processes than would an intervening verbal task. The present study includes tests 
of the effects of incubation–target task similarity in an Immediate Incubation paradigm, where 
fatigue can be ruled out, as well as in a Delayed Incubation paradigm in which fatigue relief could 
be a factor. 
Present study: outline 
The present study of effects of varying incubation activities (verbal v. spatial), detailed below, 
used a clearly creative verbal divergent task (alternate uses), scored for novelty as well as fluency, 
unlike Ellwood et al. (2009) or Helies et al. (2008). Thus, the present study is clearly focussed on 
incubation effects in creative thinking. The study used both Immediate and Delayed Incubation 
with spatial and verbal intervening tasks so that the resource overlap predictions of the selective 
forgetting and unconscious work hypotheses, as well as the issue of the possible effects of 
differential fatigue relief, could be addressed. The main aims of the study were to determine the 
extent to which Immediate Incubation is indeed helpful in divergent creative tasks (which 
previous research had not clearly addressed) and to assess the relative contributions of 
Intermittent Work, Unconscious Work and Fresh Look mechanisms of incubation in such tasks. 
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Experiment 
 
Method 
 
In this experiment the target task was the divergent production of alternative uses for a brick 
which we classed as a verbal task. The positioning of the incubation periods (which were 4 
minutes long) was either after 5 minutes of conscious work or immediately after the initial 
divergent task instructions. The activities during the incubation period were either verbal 
(anagrams) or spatial (mental rotation tasks). All participants were instructed after 5 minutes 
divergent production to draw a line after their last response up to that point.   
 
Participants. 184 (123 female, 61 male) students at the University of Hertfordshire. 
 
Design. A 2 (incubation position: immediate v. delayed.) X 3 (interpolated task: none v. verbal v. 
spatial) independent groups design was used. The Ns per experimental group were as follows: 4 
mins Delayed Incubation and spatial interpolated task (N = 25); 4 mins Delayed Incubation and 
verbal interpolated task (N = 22); 4 mins Immediate Incubation and spatial interpolated task (N 
=30) and 4 mins Immediate Incubation and verbal interpolated task (N = 30). There were also 
separate control groups for the Delayed and Immediate Incubation conditions (Ns = 47 and 30 
respectively) that provided baseline performance data for target and interpolated tasks in the 
absence of incubation periods. 
 
Procedure. In the Delayed Incubation conditions participants were told that they would be asked 
to write down possible uses for a brick different from the usual use; after 5 minutes working, 
participants were told that they would be returning to the brick uses task later in the study. During 
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the 4 mins incubation periods participants either undertook verbal tasks (anagrams) or spatial 
tasks (mental rotation items) presented in booklets. Sets of 73 five-letter single solution anagrams 
(from Gilhooly & Hay, 1977) and 48 mental rotation items (from Peters et al., 1995) were used 
and performance was scored in terms of correct solutions during the period allowed.  After the 
Delayed Incubation periods there were further 2 minutes periods of work on the brick uses task.  
 
In the Immediate Incubation conditions participants were given the standard instructions about the 
brick uses task and immediately told that the experimenter wanted them to do another task first, 
after which they would return to the uses task, and were assigned randomly to anagrams or mental 
rotation for 4 minutes. After the Immediate Incubation period they worked on the brick uses task 
for 7 minutes without a break. 
 
Control participants worked on the uses task for 7 minutes without any incubation periods and 
carried out mental rotations and anagrams for 4 minutes each. The order of the three tasks in the 
control groups was randomised. The control rotation and anagram measures were compared with 
performance on the same tasks when used as intervening activities during the incubation periods. 
The control uses task measures were compared with performance on the uses task in the 
incubation conditions. 
 
At the end of the brick uses task, participants reviewed their response sheets and were asked to 
indicate (by circling) which of the uses they had reported were subjectively novel i.e. had first 
occurred to them during the task rather than being previously known from past direct experience 
or through films, books, television and so on. Gilhooly et al., (2007), found that this was a valid 
measure of personal originality.  
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Results 
Incubation effects 
Figure 1  shows the average numbers of uses and Figure 2  the average numbers of self judged 
novel uses produced over a total of 7 mins on the uses task with 0 mins of incubation (Control 
data) or 4 mins of Delayed or 4 mins of Immediate Incubation with spatial or verbal interpolated 
tasks (mental rotations and anagrams). From these Figures it seems that both Immediate and 
Delayed incubation periods were beneficial compared to control conditions and that Immediate 
Incubation produced better performance than Delayed Incubation. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE     
 
Anova indicated that there was a significant effect of type of interpolated activity 
(none/verbal/spatial) on the number of uses reported (F (2, 178) = 7.89,  p <0.001, part η2 = .08) 
and on the number of self judged novel uses (F(2, 178) = 11.49, p < 0.001, part η2 = .11). Post hoc 
tests indicated significant differences between no incubation and both mental rotation and 
anagram filled incubation for number of uses (p<0.05) and for self judged novelty (p <0.05). No 
significant differences were found between verbal and spatial incubation conditions. 
 
Anova indicated that there was a significant effect of position of incubation (delayed/immediate) 
on the number of uses reported (F (1, 178) = 6.39, p <0.05, part η2 = .04) and on the number of 
self judged novel uses (F(1, 178) = 10.03, p < 0.01, part η2 = .05), with immediate incubation 
being more beneficial for both measures.  
 
There were no significant interactions between type of incubation activity and position of 
incubation activity on number of uses or on self judged novelty. 
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Pre- and post-incubation performance in Delayed Incubation conditions. 
In the Delayed Incubation conditions data were available for the uses task performance measures 
separately for the 5 mins pre-incubation period and the 2 mins post-incubation period and for the 
first 5 mins and the last 2 mins of use production in the control (no incubation) condition. These 
data were examined to check that any benefits in performance relative to controls were 
concentrated in the post-incubation (last 2 mins) period. One way Anovas were carried out on the 
effects of incubation activity (none/verbal/spatial) on Uses totals and Uses novelty in the first and 
last 2 mins work (pre- and post-incubation periods in the incubation conditions). The mean scores 
are shown in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
The first 5 minutes scores for Uses totals and novelty were not significantly different between the 
incubation activity conditions (none/verbal/spatial). However, the measures in the last 2 mins 
(post-incubation in the incubation conditions) were significantly different between the conditions. 
For Uses totals, F(2, 91) = 3.45, p <.05, part η2 = .07, and for Uses novelty scores, F(2,91) = 6.54, 
p < 0.01, part η2 = .11. Thus, the effects of the Delayed incubation manipulation are concentrated 
in the post-incubation period, in which incubation produces more responses and more novel 
responses than no-incubation, as would be expected. 
 
First 5 mins and last 2 mins performance in Immediate Incubation conditions 
All Uses task performance in the Immediate Incubation conditions is post-Incubation but it was 
possible to compare the first 5 minutes (which correspond to the pre-incubation time for the 
Delayed case) and the last 2 mins (which correspond to the post-incubation time in the delayed 
condition). 
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One way anovas were carried out on the effects of incubation activity (none/verbal/spatial) on 
Uses totals and Uses novelty for the first 5 mins and the last 2 mins work periods. The mean 
scores are shown in Table 2. 
Both the first 5 mins and the last 2 mins scores for Uses totals  and novelty were significantly 
different between the incubation activity conditions (none/verbal/spatial). For the first 5 mins 
Uses totals, F(2, 87) = 3.29, p <.05, part η2 = .07, and for the last 2 mins, F(2,87) = 7.01, p < 0.01, 
part η2 = .14. Similarly, For the first 5 mins Uses novel scores , F(2, 87) = 4.54, p <.05, part η2 = 
.09, and for the last 2 mins, F(2,87) = 5.78, p < 0.01, part η2 = .12. Thus, the effects of the 
Immediate incubation manipulation were apparent in immediately, in the first 5 mins, as would be 
expected, and persisted into the final 2 mins. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
   
Effects of interpolation on the interpolated incubation period tasks 
As a check on the Intermittent Conscious Work hypothesis we compared performance on the 
rotation and anagram tasks when carried out in control conditions for 4 mins and as interpolated 
tasks for 4 mins in the incubation conditions. The Intermittent Work hypothesis makes a one-
tailed prediction that performance would be impaired on a task when it is used as the interpolated, 
incubation activity, relative to controls, as participants would be distracted from the interpolated 
task by the main target task if they were intermittently working on the main task during the 
incubation period. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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However, from Figure 3 it appears that carrying out Mental Rotation as an interpolated task 
during incubation periods did not impair correct Mental Rotation performance and t-tests found 
no significant differences between interpolated and control performances. Also, there were no 
significant impairments between anagram solution rates when anagrams were done as an 
incubation activity or as a stand-alone activity. 
The possibility of fatigue effects for the control groups, who did Uses, Mental Rotations and 
Anagrams, should be considered, as possibly depressing control performance and thus masking 
any effects of intermittent work for the experimental groups.  The control participants did the 
Uses, Mental Rotation and Anagram tasks in counterbalanced orders. Anova found no 
significant order effects for any of the tasks. That is, the control scores were not depressed due 
to possible fatigue effects and the lack of significant differences between control and 
incubation groups on the interpolated tasks does not reflect fatigue. The control anagram and 
rotation scores tended to be lower than the incubation groups’scores but not significantly. 
 
It may be suggested that the participants did not give full attention to the rotation task, given 
the correct rate of about 4 in 4 minutes. The numbers of rotation items attempted were, of 
course, higher than the correct rates, with means of 6.68 (SD=2.62) in control (delayed) and 
7.12 (SD = 3.14) in the relevant incubation condition (delayed) and  these figures were not 
significantly different. In the case of anagrams, the delayed incubation group attempted more 
anagrams than the controls, with means, 18.91 (SD = 9.02) and 14.06 (SD = 5.86) respectively, 
F(1,67)= 7.02, p <0.01.) although they did not differ in numbers correct. In the immediate 
incubation conditions again slightly more items were attempted for rotations in the incubation 
condition (mean = 9.17, SD = 2.81) than in controls (mean = 8.87, SD = 3.95) and numbers of 
anagrams attempted were very similar in incubation (mean = 12.58, SD = 7.57) and control 
conditions (mean = 12.70, SD = 6.89); these differences were not significant. We may note 
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that, as with correct scores,  these results for anagrams and rotations attempted in control and 
incubation conditions are generally counter to the one tailed prediction of the Intermittent 
Work hypothesis that performance should be impaired on interpolated tasks compared to 
controls.  
 
Although type of interpolated activity in the incubation periods did not seem to affect level of 
Uses performance, it may have been that over participants, those who gave more attention to the 
interpolated tasks might then do worse on the target tasks as they would have less scope for 
Intermittent Work on the target task during incubation than those who attended less to the 
interpolated tasks. Thus, on the Intermittent Work hypothesis, negative correlations might be 
expected between interpolated tasks and the target task. In the Immediate Incubation conditions, 
anagrams correct in incubation correlated r (28) = -0.19, ns, with total Uses and 0.11, ns, with 
Novel uses; Rotations correct in incubation correlated r (28) = 0.31, ns, with total Uses and 0.36, 
p < 0.05,  with Novel uses. In the Delayed Incubation conditions, Uses totals after the incubation 
period correlated r (23) = 0.11, ns, with anagrams correct in incubation and r (20) = 0.03, ns, with 
Rotations correct in incubation; finally, Novel uses after the incubation period correlated r (23) =  
-0.07, ns, with anagrams correct and 0.18, ns, with Rotations correct in incubation.  The only 
significant correlation (2-tail tests) out of the eight is against the direction predicted by the 
Intermittent Work hypothesis, being positive rather than negative. 
  
Discussion 
First, it seems that the Intermittent Work hypothesis can be ruled out, since under that hypothesis 
we would have expected an impairment of performance on the anagram and rotation tasks when 
performed as interpolated activities during the incubation periods as against when they are 
performed as control activities. No such negative effects were found. If anything, effects were in 
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the opposite direction to that predicted on the Intermittent Work hypothesis. Further, the 
Intermittent Work hypothesis would expect negative correlations between performance on the 
interpolated tasks and performance on the target Uses task but no significant correlations in the 
predicted direction were found in any of the incubation conditions. Indeed, only two out of eight 
coefficients were in the predicted negative direction. Thus, we conclude that the effects of 
incubation found here cannot be explained by the Intermittent Work hypothesis.  
 
Immediate Incubation produced better performance than controls, which constructively replicates 
Dijksterhuis and Meurs’s (2006) finding of Immediate Incubation effects with a clearly creative 
divergent thinking task requiring novel uses and the result held over two types of incubation 
activity (spatial and verbal). Further, Immediate Incubation was more efficacious than Delayed 
Incubation in the creative task used here. The different effects of Immediate and Delayed 
Incubation suggests that different process mixtures are involved in the two forms of incubation. A 
possible interpretation is that  with Delayed Incubation, where conscious work is carried out for a 
period before incubation, relatively strong “sets” could build up and so the Delayed Incubation 
period could involve both beneficial forgetting and unconscious work.  Thus, Delayed Incubation 
is handicapped relative to Immediate Incubation for which “sets” would be expected to be non-
existent or at least weaker, as sets have less time to be established and strengthened. The 
Immediate Incubation period could involve only unconscious work without the need to overcome 
sets. That Immediate Incubation followed by conscious work was better for creative performance 
in the uses task than Delayed Incubation after conscious work is the opposite of Nordgren et al.’s 
(2011) finding with a decision task and presumably reflects differences between divergent 
creative thinking compared to convergent decision making. The decision task required 
participants to absorb a number of facts about the options and that stage may benefit from initial 
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conscious study; in contrast, the uses task draws on already stored semantic memory of object 
characteristics and requirements for various functions to be carried out.  
 
Our conclusion in favour of the Unconscious Work hypothesis as a viable mechanism is based on 
the benefits of Immediate Incubation, in which sets are unlikely to have been developed and in 
which we found no evidence for intermittent work. This leaves unconscious work as the likeliest 
explanation for the benefits of Immediate Incubation. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the question arises of what form unconscious work might 
take? Is it really possible that unconscious work could be just like conscious work but carried 
out without conscious awareness? Perhaps it is better thought of as involving spreading 
activation along associative links as against being a rule or strategy governed activity?  
 
To explore the idea that unconscious work might be a subliminal version of conscious work it 
would seem useful to consider the nature of conscious processing in the Alternate Uses task. 
This was addressed in a think aloud study by Gilhooly et al., (2007) which found that 
participants used strategies, such as scanning the object’s properties (“it’s heavy”) and using 
the retrieved properties to cue uses ( “Heavy objects can hold down things like sheets, rugs,  
tarpaulin and so on, so a heavy brick could do those things too”). However, it seems unlikely 
that unconscious work could simply duplicate the form of conscious work but without 
awareness.  Standard views in cognitive science are (a) that mental contents vary in activation 
levels, (b) that above some high activation level mental contents become available to 
consciousness, (c) that we are conscious of only a limited number of highly activated mental 
elements at any one time (that is, the contents of working memory) and (d) that strategy or rule 
based processing, as found in Gilhooly et al.’s think aloud study,  requires such highly 
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activated (conscious) material as inputs and generates highly activated (conscious) outputs. 
That is, the kind of processing which is involved in conscious work requires the highly 
activated contents of working memory, of which we are necessarily aware, given that material 
is in consciousness if and only if it is above a high activation threshold. Thus, it seems 
logically impossible that unconscious processes could duplicate conscious processes in every 
respect and stay unconscious. For example, using rules and working memory to multiply two 3 
digit numbers (e.g., 364 x 279 = ?) seems impossible without having highly activated 
representations in working memory of the numbers, the goal and intermediate results, and such 
representations are necessarily conscious. Unconscious multiplication of even moderately large 
numbers, not previously practised, seems impossible. (With practice of course, it would be 
possible to store many 3 digit multiplication results in long term memory that could then be 
directly retrieved – a type of unconscious process – but this is not the same as mental 
multiplication.) Overall, then, we discount the idea that unconscious work or thought could be 
just the same as conscious work minus awareness of any mental content. What then, might 
unconscious work consist of?  Many theorists, such as  Poincaré (1913), Campbell (1960) and 
Simonton (1995) have argued that unconscious work in incubation involves a quasi-random 
generation of associations between mental elements to produce novel combinations of ideas, 
some of which may be useful. Processes such as parallel spreading activation through a 
semantic network could serve to form remote and unusual associations (Jung-Beeman, 
Bowden,  Haberman, Frymaire, Arambel-Liu, Greenblatt, Reber & Kounios, 2004) without 
requiring activation levels to rise above the threshold of consciousness. In Helie and Sun’s 
recent (2010) Explicit-Implicit Interaction model, incubation is regarded as involving 
unconscious implicit associative processes that demand little attentional capacity in contrast 
with conscious explicit rule governed attentionally demanding processes.  According to 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren’s (2006) Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT), unconscious 
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thought, or work, has the following characteristics. It  is parallel, bottom-up, inexact, and 
importantly for the present study, divergent; whereas conscious thought is, serial, exact, and 
generally convergent. There is broad agreement over a number of theorists that unconscious 
thinking, or work, in the form of implicit associative processes based on spreading activation, 
is a possible explanation of incubation effects. On the unconscious work view then, a 
beneficial effect of Immediate Incubation would be expected, as a useful foundation of novel 
associations could be formed by spreading activation and be highly accessible when the use 
reporting stage begins.  
 
A possible difficulty in our results for the Unconscious Work hypothesis is that it predicts that an 
incubation period on a presumed verbal task such as the brick uses task should be more beneficial 
if the interpolated task is non-verbal rather than verbal. The rationale for this prediction is that 
verbal processing resources would be invoked in work on a verbal interpolated task, thus 
depleting the verbal resources available for simultaneous unconscious work on the target task. A 
spatial interpolated incubation task would not compete with simultaneous unconscious verbal 
activity and so should produce stronger incubation effects for a verbal main task. Helie and Sun’s 
(2010) Explicit-Implicit Interaction model of creative thinking explicitly makes this prediction 
and draws on supporting results which however come from reminiscence memory tasks rather 
than creative thinking tasks. The selective forgetting mechanism of the Fresh Look approach 
makes the opposite predictions regarding the effects of the interpolated tasks to those made by the 
unconscious work hypothesis. However, neither hypothesis, both of which could apply to the 
Delayed Incubation condition, was supported, as the type of interpolated activity did not affect 
target task performance. Thus, the present results did not support the predictions of the 
Unconscious Work or the Fresh Look (selective forgetting) hypotheses regarding the effects of 
type of incubation activity. In this regard, our results on effects of type of interpolated activity are 
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contrary to those of Ellwood et al., (2009) which were in line with the Unconscious Work 
hypothesis. However, there were some differences between this study and the Ellwood et al. study 
which may be relevant. Ellwood et al. did not inform their participants that the target task would 
be returned to after incubation. In our study the goal of returning was stated and this may be an 
important factor affecting the incubation process. Future studies will address this issue. A second 
major difference is that Ellwood et al., actually used a fluency task that simply required reporting 
of uses for a piece of paper but not original or novel uses. That the Ellwood et al., task was not 
tapping creativity is indicated by the reported lack of correlation between performance on their 
target task and the personality characteristic of Openness on a Big-5 personality test. Openness 
typically correlates well with creative divergent test performance (Batey & Furnham, 2008). Also, 
it may be noted that our results included novelty scores which Ellwood et al., did not. 
 
Another explanation for the lack of any effect of the type of incubation activity in the present 
study is that we may have misclassified the Uses task as a purely verbal task. Indeed, Gilhooly et 
al. (2007) did find protocol evidence of imagery processes in the Uses task and it may be that the 
Uses task is better conceived as invoking both verbal and spatial processes. If so, then both types 
of incubation activity could have similar effects according to the Unconscious Work and Selective 
Forgetting hypotheses for Delayed Incubation.  Future research will aim to address this point by 
using creative tasks that are a more purely spatial ( e.g., mental synthesis with shapes, Pearson, 
Logie & Gilhooly, 1999) or verbal (e.g. mental synthesis with words, Haught & Johnson-Laird, 
2003). 
 
Finally, we note that our results have a clear practical application. When faced with a task 
requiring that familiar objects be used in new ways, it seems that it would be helpful to put aside 
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the task immediately and return to it after a period, allowing unconscious incubation processes to 
operate, before undertaking conscious work.  
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Table 1. 
Pre- and post incubation scores for total Brick uses and Brick use novelty over incubation 
conditions (Control - none/verbal/spatial). 
 
Delayed Incubation 
 
First 5 mins/Pre-incubation Brick Uses       Last 2 mins/Post-incubation Brick Uses 
     
 
Control Verbal  Spatial   Control Verbal  Spatial  
(N = 47) (N=22) (N = 25)  (N=47) (N = 22) (N=25) 
Mean     SD Mean    SD   Mean   SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean   SD 
7.90       3.24   8.59   3.67   9.60  4.09  1.85  1.25 2.21   1.06 2.76    1.85 
 
First 5 mins/Pre-incubation Brick Novelty          Last 2 mins/ Post-incubation Brick Novelty 
     
 
Control Verbal  Spatial   Control Verbal  Spatial  
(N = 47) (N=22) (N = 25)  (N=47) (N = 22) (N=25) 
Mean     SD Mean    SD   Mean   SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean   SD 
2.31       1.77   2.86   1.91    3.52  2.51  0.77  0.78 1.36   0.95 1.56    1.22 
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Table 2. 
First 5 mins and last 2 mins scores for total Brick uses (and Brick use novelty) over 
incubation conditions (Control - none/verbal/spatial). 
Immediate Incubation 
First 5 Minutes Brick Uses    Last 2 minutes Brick Uses 
     
 
Control Verbal  Spatial   Control Verbal  Spatial  
(N = 30) (N=30) (N =30)  (N=30) (N = 30) (N=30) 
Mean     SD Mean    SD   Mean   SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD    Mean   SD 
8.67      3.97   11.23  3.92  11.54   6.02  1.50  1.41 3.03   1.84    2.83    2.14 
 
 
First 5 Minutes Brick Novelty   Last 2 minutes Brick Novelty 
     
 
Control Verbal  Spatial   Control Verbal  Spatial  
(N = 30) (N=30) (N =30)  (N=30) (N = 30) (N=30) 
Mean     SD Mean    SD   Mean   SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD    Mean   SD 
3.00      2.90   4.37   2.91     5.53  3.88  0.73  0.86 1.83   1.53    1.63   1.50
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Figure 1. Mean number of alternative uses produced during delayed and Immediate Incubation 
using verbal or spatial interpolated tasks. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
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Figure 2. Mean number of self rated novel uses produced by Delayed and Immediate Incubation 
groups using verbal or spatial interpolated tasks. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
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 Figure 3. Mental Rotation and anagram performance when carried out as an interpolated 
(incubation) task or as control task. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
